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TRANSCRIPT OF KEYNOTE SPEECH 
HON. CANDY W. DALE 
Thank you, Professor Rumel for your introduction. I also want to 
thank Molly and Ingrid for asking me to speak today and also recognize 
Dean Adams and the other members of the Idaho Law Review staff. I 
enjoyed talking this morning with some of the members of the law re-
view staff and recalling my time as Editor-in-Chief and the celebration 
we had when “white out” was invented and we could use it when editing 
the typewritten notes, comments or articles submitted to us! I also want 
to commend the exemplary presentations during this morning’s ses-
sions—I am looking forward to what I am certain will be the same quali-
ty of presentations this afternoon. 
After listening this morning to the presentations, I am hoping I can 
weave in a few things that I heard into my speech this afternoon. When 
I was asked to give a keynote, I wondered what was expected as a key-
note during a law review symposium? So I did what now most Ameri-
cans do when they have a question like this and I Googled “keynote.” I 
learned that a keynote is a presentation that is consistent with the un-
derlying theme of a celebration, symposium, or educational conference, 
and also that it typically costs a lot to secure the speaker to give the 
keynote address. I thought, “Okay, Molly, you led me astray”—clearly I 
am not getting $225,000 and I am sure my comments are not going to be 
worthy of anything near that—but I will give it my best shot. 
I did wonder, what can I add? I did not want to talk about my time 
as Editor-in-Chief. Then I realized it was highly likely that I was asked 
to talk at this Symposium because of the many, and I emphasize 
“many,” years I have been working in the employment law area – first 
as an attorney for twenty-five years and later on the bench. I just cele-
brated eight years as a United States Magistrate Judge and was reap-
pointed to a second eight-year term. So I have had the opportunity to 
weigh in on employment cases that have been assigned to me and also 
conduct settlement conferences as the mediator in a variety of employ-
ment law cases. I obviously have an ongoing interest in learning about 
developments in the ever evolving and challenging area of Employment 
Law. It has been good to hear from those that are experts in this field 
today, as I no longer consider myself an expert in any particular field, 
given the variety of matters that come before the United States District 
Court on any given day. 
What I thought I would do this afternoon is give you an overview of 
some of the employment laws that I have actually lived through and 
helped interpret for clients when I was in practice and for the litigants 
and public while I have had the privilege to serve on the federal bench. I 
will not review these laws in excruciating detail, and will conclude by 
giving you some tips or best practices that come from my years of expe-
rience, although I am sure most everyone in this room already knows 
and follows them. By providing this overview, I hope to illustrate the 
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spectrum of what was old or new then and what now is not so new. So 
the title of my speech is “Something Old, Something New,” and I also 
will talk about “something borrowed” and also “something blue,” to 
maintain consistency with the folklore many of you may recall that is 
attached to weddings, as my theme. I also may touch briefly upon trends 
we are seeing in Federal Court in Idaho, although I am not sure the 
trends in our Court are much different than around the country. 
First, I thought I would put “old” in context, in other words, mean-
ing me, and start by telling a story about a personal experience that 
came to mind this morning when I was listening to the presentations 
about pregnancy discrimination and the Equal Pay Act. When I was 
about six months pregnant—and this would have been in early 1990—
my senior partner and mentor at the law firm we recently had started, 
Hall Farley Oberrecht & Blanton, had an interesting conversation. At 
the time, I was working with him a lot on medical malpractice cases 
while I also was working in the employment law area and developing 
that practice. I can still visualize the day when he brought one of our 
doctor clients into my office and said to the doctor: “I’m sure you re-
member Candy,” as I stood up from my desk chair, moved away from my 
desk and approached the doctor to shake his hand. At that point, my 
senior partner says: “And look, she’s pregnant.” The doctor probably 
could have figured that out on his own, because I was past the point in 
my pregnancy when any casual observer otherwise might not want to 
ask. My law partner went on to tell our client: “Don’t worry, she’s going 
to be back and she’s going to keep working on your case.” And he con-
tinues to praise me by sharing his opinion with the doctor: “I think she’s 
going to be, or actually already is, the best woman trial attorney in this 
state.” 
After the client leaves, I tell my partner, “We need to talk. First of 
all, our client could tell I was pregnant. You did not need to tell him I 
was pregnant, and you did not need to tell him not to worry about 
whether I was coming back to work. You could have left that conversa-
tion to me and to a more appropriate context.” Next, I shifted the bur-
den, so to speak, to factors other than sex and said: “By the way, I hope 
you introduce me someday as the best trial attorney in the state and not 
the best woman trial attorney.” 
Okay, now I will continue with putting my career in the context of 
“old.” You have heard already that I graduated from the College of Law 
in 1982 and was Editor-in-Chief in 1981-82. At the time, of course, we 
had the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII). We also had the Age Dis-
crimination in Employment Act of 1967. We had, as you have heard, the 
Equal Pay Act of 1963 and, of course, the Fair Labor Standards Act—
talk about old, the FLSA is the oldest employment law statute, having 
been enacted in1938. We also had Section 504 of The Rehabilitation Act 
(predecessor in many ways to the ADA) and the Pregnancy Discrimina-
tion Act of 1978 that you have heard about this morning. When I was in 
law school, we did not learn a lot about any of these laws; in fact, I do 
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not readily recall whether, or where, or to what extent Title VII was 
covered, although it probably was included in our constitutional law 
classes in a chapter or half of one.   
I did take a Labor Law class and really enjoyed it, so I expressed 
early on to one of my supervising attorneys at Moffatt Thomas that I 
was interested in working on labor law projects for the firm. This super-
vising attorney, who also was one of my mentors, had served as a staff 
attorney for the NLRB during the early years of his career. Well, most of 
you that know Idaho know that, if you want to be a labor lawyer in Ida-
ho, you might starve unless you do something like Professor Rumel did 
with the Idaho Education Association or some other associations. There 
is labor law work here in Idaho, but there is not necessarily enough 
work to keep more than one or two attorneys busy full time. 
Shortly after I reminded my supervising attorney that I was inter-
ested in labor law, two fortuitous events occurred. First, the EEOC filed 
a lawsuit, along with an individual plaintiff, against Bonner County in 
North Idaho and Moffatt Thomas was asked to defend the case. Second, 
and around the same time, a wrongful discharge case was filed against 
Union Oil and we were asked to defend that case as well. My supervis-
ing attorney asked me to work on both of these cases, asking me first 
whether I knew anything about the EEOC as a plaintiff and next 
whether I knew whether wrongful discharge was a tort or contract 
claim. These were cases of “first impression” for the firm, and to a cer-
tain extent for Idaho. Remember that this was during the mid-1980’s. 
Anyway I started to figure out the statutory framework of Title VII and 
the procedural guidelines of the EEOC, as well as researched the day-
lights out of case law in other jurisdictions regarding wrongful dis-
charge. The assignment of these two cases to me as the associate, unbe-
knownst at the time, truly set my career in employment law in motion. 
Also, remember this case filed by the EEOC was filed before the 1991 
amendments to Title VII. So in hindsight, I figure the firm may have 
asked me to work on the EEOC case because they believed there was 
not much damage I could do or that much I could lose for the client, be-
cause noneconomic damages and punitive damages were not available 
under Title VII, nor was there a right to jury trial, prior to 1991. 
And the wrongful discharge case involved an employee of Union Oil 
who was charged with and convicted of DUI and placed on probation by 
the State. The problem in the case that eventually was addressed by the 
Idaho Court of Appeals involved a letter my client gave the plaintiff 
when placing him on probationary status in his job that incorporated 
many of the conditions of his criminal probation. The legal question was 
whether the probation letter established a contractual exception to the 
employment at-will rule. The case was Holmes v. Union Oil, and if you 
look it up, you will note that Don Burnett, former Dean of the UI Col-
lege of Law and former interim President of the University of Idaho 
wrote the majority opinion for the Court of Appeals. Of course, this piece 
of trivia dates me (as well as my dear friend Don Burnett).    
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There are some other cases I was involved with that I would like to 
touch upon, as they involved issues of first impression in the Idaho ap-
pellate courts and you may find them when you research certain em-
ployment law topics under Idaho law. Ostrander v. Farm Bureau was a 
case that went to the Idaho Supreme Court in 1993. The question in 
that case was whether an independent contractor has a right to sue for 
employment discrimination. I remember practicing my argument and 
how I would explain to the appellate judges that true independent con-
tractors, who are human beings after all, should not be protected by the 
employment discrimination statutes. The end result was that I was suc-
cessful, on behalf of my client, and true independent contractors have no 
ability to file a claim under the Idaho Human Rights Act like employees 
are able to file—they do not have the same rights as employees under 
Idaho law in this regard.  
Another case I want to talk about is Paterson v. State of Idaho, a 
case that was decided by the Idaho Supreme Court in 1996. The plaintiff 
was an employee of the Department of Administration who was inter-
viewed in connection with an internal sexual harassment investigation 
and later decided to make a claim herself against the supervisor who 
was the subject of the investigation. In her lawsuit, filed under the Ida-
ho Human Rights Act, Paterson alleged she was a victim of inappropri-
ate language and conduct in the work place by the supervisor. The case 
was tried to a jury and resulted in a favorable verdict for Paterson 
against both the State of Idaho and the supervisor who was individually 
named as a defendant. 
I was not the defense attorney at trial, but was asked to represent 
the State on appeal: primary issues of first impression were presented. 
First, the question was whether the $98,000 in punitive damages 
awarded against the State of Idaho, which included $1,000 for 98 “will-
ful” violations of the Idaho Human Rights Act, should be set aside. Es-
sentially, the jury awarded $1,000 in punitive damages for each inap-
propriate comment (or “dirty joke”) the supervisor had made according 
to a record or notes created by the plaintiff that was not contemporane-
ous with the events she recorded. Well, the Idaho Supreme Court ac-
cepted my argument and found that the $1,000 cap on punitive damages 
for willful violations of the Idaho Human Rights Act precluded an award 
for more than $1,000 for the hostile work environment claim the jury 
found Paterson had proved at trial. In other words, the court found a 
hostile work environment claim based on sex or other protected classifi-
cation is one, not multiple, violations of the IHRA. 
The other significant holding in the case was that the supervisor 
could not be held individually liable under the IHRA. Therefore, the en-
tirety of the $43,500 verdict against the supervisor was set aside. With 
regard to the verdict against the State of Idaho, it was reduced from 
$103,000 to a total of $6,000—$5,000 for the noneconomic damages 
award to Paterson (which was affirmed) and $1,000 in punitive damag-
es. It clearly was a win for my client and a victory for me as counsel in 
2016 TRANSCRIPT OF KEYNOTE SPEECH 819 
 
the case. But the cap on punitive damages remains, despite the much 
higher cap under federal law, and may be subject to ongoing debate. 
The next case that went to the Idaho appellate court I would like to 
touch upon is Parker v. Boise Telco, decided by the Idaho Supreme Court 
in 1996. This case involved my client, an employer who had taken a 
lawyer’s advice and added disclaimers to their policy manual or employ-
ee handbook to preserve the employment at-will status of the employees. 
The language was not in the original handbook provided to the plaintiff 
upon her hire, but she later was required to  acknowledge receipt of the 
new handbook and her at-will status to remain employed. She claimed 
in her lawsuit that the after-the-fact disclaimers were not enforceable or 
effective. However, the appellate court accepted my argument and the 
case was dismissed, affirming the proposition that an employer can 
change an employee’s status from not at-will to at-will, if they do it cor-
rectly. One of the reasons I mention this case is that one of the recent 
trends we have seen in Federal Court is public employees challenging 
their otherwise “at-will” status based on language that is in (or not in) 
policy manuals. 
The last Idaho state case I want to talk about is Jeremiah v. Yanke 
Machine Shop. It was a hostile work environment and retaliation case 
brought by a former machinist who was Romanian. This was in 1998, 
when we were seeing some of the first retaliation claims in Idaho that 
have grown tremendously in number over the past several years here in 
Idaho and nationally. I believe it is safe to say that more discrimination 
cases than not involve a retaliation claim as well. Jeremiah claimed he 
was discriminated and retaliated against based on his race, and filed his 
lawsuit under both Title VII and the IHRA. 
Most of the workers in the machine shop were men—not much dif-
ferent than most machine shops in the country at the time. And in this 
case, there was a lot of hazing and horseplay that went on in the ma-
chine shop. And there was evidence of how rude the co-workers were to 
Jeremiah, as well as the horseplay he initiated himself. However, some 
of it clearly had a racist bend, such as a fake green card made out of 
green rubber that was left on his tool or lunch box and references to him 
as a “goat-f…er.” Allegedly, this nickname was either chosen by or given 
to Jeremiah as a deviation from jokes or name calling of other names, 
such as “sheep-f…er.” Now, those of you attending this Symposium that 
are not from Idaho will not necessarily understand the significance of 
sheep here in Idaho, but we can talk about it later if you would like. 
As a strategy for trying the case, my client and my readings on trial 
strategy suggested that I needed to desensitize the jury and readily re-
peat the “goat-f…er” name in open court enough times that it would 
sound less and less offensive. So I did that, but it did not work out as 
well as intended! And just this morning, seriously, when I was review-
ing some reports on a judiciary news list serve, I saw a report of a case 
where a judge had failed to throw an attorney off a case in response to 
the other side’s request after the attorney had written a letter or sent an 
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email to the opposing party stating something like: “I don’t give a hoot 
about your f-ing settlement offer.” 
It can appear ironic when things like this come full circle, right? 
But so far I have not been asked to remove a lawyer or award sanctions 
for using the f-word, and I suppose it would take egregious circumstanc-
es for me to do that. After all, I used the word in open court, although it 
was evidence in the case! Anyway, back to the case itself that went on 
appeal, after a verdict adverse to my client, to the Idaho Supreme Court. 
Of significance to issues that confront employment lawyers, the Idaho 
Supreme Court affirmed the trial judge’s ruling that a “no probable 
cause” finding by the EEOC or the Idaho Human Rights Commission is 
not admissible. The appellate court agreed with the trial judge that a 
“no probable cause” determination is not admissible, whereas a “proba-
ble cause” determination likely is admissible.  
So, these were some of the employment law cases I was involved 
with during my years of private practice and now I would like to turn to 
discuss briefly the new laws or statutory amendments that came about 
in the 1990s and later. 
The Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 brought a significant 
change to the landscape regarding discrimination based on physical and 
mental ability or inability, and the legal duty of reasonable accommoda-
tion. Previously, we had the Rehabilitation Act that provided certain 
protections to handicapped individuals, albeit the protections were ex-
tremely limited. The ADA was amended in 2008 (ADAAA), around the 
same time that I started on the bench, so I have not had an opportunity 
yet to look closely at the changes. However, I do believe the amend-
ments, by broadening the definition of disability, may have reversed the 
trend of lawsuits being filed with “regarded as” disabled claims that I 
was seeing during my practice. But I will leave this to the experts in the 
room. 
The Civil Rights Act of 1991, as I previously mentioned, brought 
huge changes in Title VII and continues to present a lot of opportunities 
for trial attorneys to make a difference in this area of the law. I have 
already touched upon the fact that Title VII now allows for noneconomic 
and punitive damages, as well as trial by jury. 
The FMLA was adopted in 1993, so I did a lot of training about 
what it meant for, first the larger employers, and then the smaller em-
ployers. The 1938 Fair Labor Standards Act developed in the late 1990’s 
with the addition of exemptions from overtime for highly compensated 
computer professionals and next for highly compensated executives and 
administrators. And one of the jury trials I have had since I have been 
on the bench involved the highly compensated exemption for adminis-
trators and executives. I can tell you it is a challenge to draft jury in-
structions in these cases because standardized instructions that cover 
these exemptions are rare, or were at the time of this trial. But as you 
all know or should know, the jury instructions should be the starting 
place and ending place for full prosecution or defense of these claims, 
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just like every lawsuit. I cannot over emphasize, however, how im-
portant good jury instructions are and how much they are appreciated 
and followed by the jurors. 
Before I mention the final case I want to talk about today and be-
fore I walk through a really fast check list of tips that incorporates the 
spectrum of old and new employment laws, I want to reference what the 
“borrowed” is for my folklore theme: the borrowed are concepts or legal 
principles from labor law that have been injected into employment law. 
Most specifically, retaliation and what constitutes protected activity, 
and industrial due process. I dealt with these concepts as they evolved 
while I was in private practice and you can find them when you read 
judicial decisions around the country. 
The last case I want to talk about today, in part because it weaves 
back into the Latta v. Otter marriage equality decision that I authored 
and that Professor Rumel referenced during his introduction of me a few 
minutes ago, is the case of Dew v. Edmunds, a recent decision that I au-
thored that was not appealed (so I can talk a bit about it). Mr. Dew ap-
plied for the position of Director of the Idaho Commission on Human 
Rights, the position Linda Goodman who is here today holds currently, 
and later filed a lawsuit contending he was discriminated against, based 
on his sexual orientation and his disability. He had flown to Boise from 
Iowa after an initial telephone interview to interview in person with the 
Commissioners and others. He first was interviewed by several of the 
Commissioners before he interviewed with the then director of the Idaho 
Human Rights Commission and the Director of the Department of Labor 
(Edmunds). 
Dew claimed in his lawsuit that he was asked a lot of questions by 
the Director of the Department of Labor about an organization he had 
started in Iowa that he was working with in Iowa at the time he applied 
for the position in Idaho. That organization was an advocacy organiza-
tion for LGBT individuals with disabilities. He claimed that, at the point 
in time he started talking about his affiliation with this organization 
and disclosed the fact that he, himself, had suffered from a seizure dis-
order that he was no longer suffering from, the Director of the Depart-
ment of Labor’s tone and questions turned very negative. He claimed, 
and I will quote, that Edmunds’s “facial expression contorted like he just 
smelled a dirty diaper.” Dew claimed he felt degraded during and after 
the meeting with Edmunds and after being “left at the curb” to return to 
his hotel in Boise upon being told the full Commission needed to meet to 
discuss his application. Prior to his meeting with the Edmunds, he was 
very positive about all the prior interviews and went into the meeting 
with Edmunds pretty much believing he had the job. But, rather than 
staying in Boise and spending the weekend exploring Boise as previous-
ly planned, he thought long and hard about what he had just experi-
enced and decided that very next day, or the next Monday, to withdraw 
his application for the director’s position because he thought it was a 
futile gesture to keep his application alive because of the attitude con-
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veyed by Edmunds and the fact he did not receive an offer after that last 
interview. 
Shortly after the complaint was filed, the state Defendants filed a 
motion to dismiss. They made two primary legal arguments based on 
the pleadings: first, they argued that there was no adverse employment 
action to support Dew’s claims of discrimination because he affirmative-
ly withdrew his application before the hiring process was completed; 
and second, even if Dew could allege facts supporting constructive with-
drawal, the Defendants were entitled to qualified immunity because 
there was no clearly established law, at the time, that protected employ-
ees from discrimination in employment based on sexual orientation. 
In opposition to the qualified immunity argument, Dew pointed to 
the Latta decision, and the Smithkline decision by the Ninth Circuit, 
addressing classifications based on sexual orientation. So I was present-
ed with an opportunity to explain the rationale and scope of the Latta 
decision in my October 2015 decision granting defendants’ motion to 
dismiss Dew’s Section 1983 claim. 
In my decision, I explained that Latta could not be used to argue 
that the law was clearly established at the time Dew applied for the po-
sition at the ICHR to prohibit employment discrimination based on sex-
ual orientation. Instead, the debate in Idaho and nationally, other than 
perhaps for federal employees, was continuing and the defendants in 
this case could not be held liable for an alleged violation of a constitu-
tional right that was not clearly established at the time they allegedly 
discriminated against Mr. Dew. Although I did find dismissal based on 
qualified immunity was appropriate, I have since reflected on the awk-
ward, yet appropriate, argument counsel for the ICHR made during the 
hearing on defendants’ motion. By arguing that the law was not clearly 
established regarding employment discrimination based on sexual ori-
entation, the lawyer was in essence arguing inconsistent with what she 
and her client may have believed the law should be or might be someday 
soon. In fact, Dew himself had included a reference in his lawsuit to the 
advocacy for the “Add the Words” campaign by the Director of the ICHR 
he sought to succeed but then sued. As I listened to the ICHR attorney’s 
argument, I thought about my own argument in the Ostrander case I 
mentioned earlier that some could have said suggested independent con-
tractors are not humans. 
But what I saw in the Dew case was advocacy on both sides of the 
issue: it is incredibly rewarding as a judge when I see that advocacy put 
forth for both the employee and employer in very effective ways, along 
with inherent respect for the rule of law. 
Now, here quickly I will review some best practice tips: First, it is 
crucial to have a complete understanding of the statutory framework, 
including regulations and guidelines (from the EEOC, Department of 
Labor, etc.), and case law of the employment issues you are dealing 
with. Next, understand there are different statutes of limitation in Ida-
ho and at the Federal level for filing discrimination, wage claims or oth-
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er suits Next, and this may be the most important—you need a solid 
understanding of the burdens of proof. And this is an area where we 
could talk about what once was new is now old and what now is new is 
still evolving –the theme of this symposium. But think about the ele-
ments to a prima facie case, burden shifting under McDonnell Douglas, 
and affirmative defenses. Research and understand pretext—what con-
stitutes significant and substantial that has to be proved by the plain-
tiff? When I was in practice, we tried hard to parse through whether the 
plaintiff was asserting disparate treatment or disparate impact, or some 
combination. As I learned this morning, now the discussion revolves 
around the distinction between conscious intent and implicit bias. How 
different are these legal concepts or principles from disparate treatment 
or impact? Next on my list is the need to understand retaliation. As I 
previously mentioned, retaliation claims, either under a statute or Idaho 
case law, are probably the trend we see the most in employment law-
suits filed in Federal Court. Determining what is protected activity and 
what protected activity means vis-a-vis the case law or the statutes is 
crucial. Next, having a full understanding about what damages are 
available is crucial. In the Jeremiah vs. Yanke case I mentioned earlier, 
the verdict and award of damages to the plaintiff was analyzed in post 
trial motions by the court under both under the Idaho Human Rights 
Act And Title VII. Given there were different caps on certain damages, 
the judge did a comparison and the one that was most favorable for the 
plaintiff was the one that prevailed. And, also on my list of best practic-
es is e-discovery and social media. We could have a symposium, a two-
day symposium, just talking about these issues and how they come into 
play, not just in the area of employment law, but in the practice of law 
as a whole. Finally, I will mention employment practices liability insur-
ance that was relatively new when I was in private practice but contin-
ues to inject some interesting dynamics to the defense and prosecution 
of employment cases. 
Today, I have talked about the spectrum of old, new, and borrowed 
relative to employment law. So that leaves me to conclude by talking 
about something blue. And you may be thinking, “Oh, this is going to be 
blue, this is going to be a downer, pessimistic blue.” Right? I am not go-
ing to do that and instead I want you to look outside the window here 
and look at the gorgeous blue color of the sky today. I prefer most times 
to put a positive spin on things if I can do so. So, the blue today that I 
want you to think about is the incredibly good work you all are doing as 
lawyers practicing employment law, either here in Idaho or elsewhere. 
It does not matter whether you are representing an employee, or an em-
ployer, or labor or management. Think of the privilege that all of us in 
this room have, and some of the law students may choose in the future, 
to be making a difference in the workplace. 
And I thought Dean Adams, when he kicked off the Symposium 
this morning, made some really good comments about how important a 
quality work life, not just a quantity of work life, means to all of us. He 
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mentioned how being the dean and being called “Dean” everywhere he 
goes adds relevancy and meaning to his work, not just identity. So much 
is attached to our workplace and work life experiences, including self-
esteem and self-worth. And for me, I am called Judge virtually every-
where other than home. It identifies my workplace, but much more than 
that. Unfortunately, there are times when we all can lose sight of all the 
good things we are doing, and have the privilege of doing, by virtue of 
our law degrees and our trusted relationships with clients and the pub-
lic.  So this is how I want to end my speech today—by commending all of 
you and asking also that you think about the type of cases you have 
worked on and the unique factual scenarios you have experienced in 
your practice—truly, you cannot make that stuff up! But seriously, I ap-
preciate the presentations this morning and that is the blue. Something 
blue is the good stuff and the good work that you are doing, that we all 
are doing, to make the workplace better and better for everyone. You are 
making a difference. Thank you. 
